mardi 13 janvier 2015

On Translating Religious Reasons: Rawls, Habermas and the Quest for a Neutral Public Sphere

Conférence | Talk



(University of Ottawa)


On Translating Religious Reasons: Rawls, Habermas and the Quest for a Neutral Public Sphere



Friday, January 16th, 2014
3:00pm

Carleton University
River Building

mercredi 7 janvier 2015

Aesthetics Experts, Guides to Value (D. McIver Lopes)

Conférence | Lecture


(University of British Columbia)


Aesthetics Experts, Guides to Value



A theory of aesthetic value should explain the performance of aesthetic experts, for aesthetic experts are agents whose acts track aesthetic value. Aesthetic empiricism, the theory that an item’s aesthetic value is its power to yield aesthetic pleasure, suggests that aesthetic experts are best at locating aesthetic pleasure, especially given aesthetic internalism, the view that aesthetic reasons always have motivating force. Problems with empiricism and internalism open the door to an alternative. Aesthetic experts perform a range of actions not aimed at pleasure. Yet their reasons for acting are aesthetic. Since aesthetic values figure in aesthetic reasons, we can read a non-empiricist theory of aesthetic value off aesthetic experts’ reasons for acting.

Friday, January 16th, 2014
3:00pm

University of Ottawa
Desmarais Hall (55, Laurier East)
Room 8161

lundi 8 décembre 2014

Is There a Phenomenology of Agency? (M. Mylopoulos)

Conférence | Talk



(Carleton University and Institut Jean Nicod)


Is There a Phenomenology of Agency?


It is often held that, just as there is something it is like to smell a rose, taste chocolate, and hear a siren, there is something it is like to perform an action. In other words, a view to which many people are drawn is that there exists a phenomenology of agency. But while this is a common starting point for further theorizing, rarely is it critically examined on its own. In this paper, I aim to remedy this situation. First, I clarify what theorists seem to have in mind when they claim that there is a distinctive, proprietary phenomenology of agency. Next, I canvass particular strategies for establishing that there is such a thing. To begin, I explain why introspection alone will not suffice for this task. Following this, I introduce and employ the socalled method of phenomenal contrast (cf. Siegel 2012), presenting contrasting pairs of cases, for which, in the one case, agentive phenomenology may seem to be present, and in the other, absent. I offer two types of skeptical response to such cases, which serve to block the inference to the best explanation that is required in order to establish the existence of agentive phenomenology on their basis. I then consider two further strategies for dealing with these skeptical responses. I label these the robust conceivability strategy (Horgan 2012) and the epistemic access strategy (cf. Goldman 1993; Pitt 2004). I argue that each of these fails to offer a satisfactory response to the skeptics, and therefore to give us good reason to believe that there is a phenomenology of agency. I conclude that skepticism about the existence of such phenomenology is alive and well. In the final section of the talk, I explain why, even given this result, all hope is not lost. I offer an account of conscious action that falls short of establishing that it is accompanied by any distinct, proprietary phenomenology, but arguably retains all the robust features of our awareness of ourselves as acting that theorists interested in this phenomenon set out to explain in the first place.

Tuesday, December 9th, 2014
3:00pm

Carleton University
Dunton Tower

mardi 25 novembre 2014

Freedom, Money, and Justice as Fairness (B. Neufeld)

Conférence | Talk



(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee)


Freedom, Money, and Justice as Fairness


The first principle of John Rawls’s conception of ‘justice as fairness’ secures a set of ‘basic liberties’ equally for all citizens within the constitutional structure of society. The ‘worth’ of citizens’ basic liberties, however, may vary depending upon their wealth and income. Against Rawls, G. A. Cohen contends that an absence of money directly constrains citizens’ liberty, and not simply the worth of liberty. Cohen’s argument threatens a core feature of justice as fairness, as it is unclear why the parties within the ‘original position’ would endorse the lexical priority of the first principle over the ‘difference principle’ (which concerns the distribution of wealth and income in society) if both principles similarly shape the freedom enjoyed by citizens. In response to Cohen’s challenge, I advance five points. First, I explain that Rawls is concerned with the freedom of citizens to exercise their two ‘moral powers,’ their ‘sense of justice’ and their capacity for a ‘conception of the good,’ and not their overall ‘negative liberty.’ Second, with respect to citizens’ sense of justice, Rawls’s insistence that the ‘fair value’ of the political liberties be secured for all citizens inoculates this aspect of justice as fairness against Cohen’s challenge. Third, with respect to citizens’ second moral power, it is necessary to distinguish between its two aspects: (a) citizens’ capacity to form and revise their conceptions of the good, and (b) citizens’ capacity to pursue those conceptions. Fourth, clarifying the ‘basic needs principle’ within justice as fairness, including adding to it a right to adequate discretionary time, ensures that citizens will be roughly equally free to form and revise their conceptions of the good. Fifth, with respect to citizens’ freedom to pursue their conceptions of the good, Rawlsians should concede that the difference principle permits inequalities in this freedom, but minimizes them to the greatest feasible extent. I conclude that Cohen’s criticism of Rawls’s distinction between a liberty and its worth is not fatal to justice as fairness.

Friday, November 28th, 2014
3:00pm

Carleton University
River Building

The Justification of Statistical Decisions in Clinical Trials (R. Stanev)

Conférence | Talk


(Ottawa Hospital Research Institute and University of Ottawa Faculty of Medecine)


The Justification of Statistical Decisions in Clinical Trials



In recent years, there has been a growing concern about the proper conduct and monitoring of clinical trials. High on the agenda of clinical researchers is the inadequate reporting of randomized controlled trials (RCTs), including trials that are stopped early due to benefit, harm or futility. Despite efforts from regulatory agencies (e.g., Health Canada) issuing recommendations and guidance for both the conduct and reporting of RCTs, recent systematic reviews of RCTs show that top medical journals continue to publish trials without requiring authors to report sufficient details for readers to evaluate statistical decisions carefully.

In my talk, I present a systematic way of modeling and simulating interim decisions of RCTs. By taking an approach that is both general and rigorous, my proposal models and evaluates early stopping decisions of RCTs based on a clear and consistent set of criteria. The framework permits decision analysts to generate and answer 'what-if' questions by simulating alternate trial scenarios. I illustrate the framework with a case study of an RCT that was stopped early due to futility. This was a trial evaluating an intervention to prevent a brain-infection in HIV+ symptomatic individuals. 

Friday, November 28th, 2014
3:00pm

University of Ottawa
Desmarais Hall (55, Laurier East)
Room 8161

mardi 18 novembre 2014

Emotions and Agency (C. Tappolet)

Conférence | Talk


(Université de Montréal)


Emotions and Agency



What is the relationship between emotions and reasons? This question is central to the assessment of the common claim that emotions constitute a threat to the kind of agency that is often considered to be characteristic of human being, namely, autonomous agency. This is so because the capacity to respond to reasons is often thought to be essential to autonomous agency. The focus will be on cases of akratic actions caused by emotions that conflict with the agent's better judgement. I shall propose that even in such dysfunctional cases, we are able, under certain conditions, not only to track reasons but also to be reason-responsive when we act on our emotions.

Friday, November 21st, 2014
3:00pm

University of Ottawa
Desmarais Hall (55, Laurier East)
Room 8161