Merleau-Ponty, 21st-Century Physics, and Natural Time as Phenomenon and Norm of Sense
Source : Wikipedia
Movement is central to Merleau-Ponty’s effort to
find a sense, meaning, right within being. This effort turns him to a study of
perceived movement, which leads him to challenge views that flatten movement
into an abstract dislocation between already determinate locations A and B, in
an already determinate spatiotemporal framework. Instead, perceived movement
first engenders the spatiotemporal context in which it contingently comes to
follow a determinate course. Later, he detects this sort of movement in nature
itself, especially life. The movement of nature does not simply manifest
dislocation within an already determinate space- or time- frame, rather, it
indicates a ‘prior’ engendering of space and time as determinate. This
indirectly reveals that being itself is not fully determinate, but is an
internally deep, open, field. But how are we to understand the peculiar
temporality of a movement ‘prior’ to time, that engenders time? I
first lead this problem out of Merleau-Ponty. Next I critically engage with
physicist Julian Barbour’s recent concept of time as emerging from
dynamics, versus time being a fixed background of dynamics. This provides a
helpful conceptual model for the sort of temporality in question here—and fits
with and is complemented by Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the invisible and the
visible. Barbour leads us into key problems in quantum mechanics, regarding
probabilistic, indeterminate being, and measurement. I explore these problems
and connect them to time via a model from cryptography, and discussion of how
quantum computer programs work (on IBM’s Quantum Experience platform). Linking
this with Barbour’s time model lets me suggest a concept of time as a
contingent phenomenon that would also be a first norm of sense that fits
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology.
The puzzle of skilled action is
that of explaining how it is that skilled action exhibits robust intelligence
despite being largely governed by automatic control processes that are often
characterized as brute, reflex-like, and paradigmatically unintelligent.
Recently, some have argued that the automatic control involved in skill is
sensitive in key respects to the semantic content of an agent’s intentions and
other propositional attitude states, and is thereby genuinely intelligent, or
"proto-intelligent", contrary to what others have assumed (e.g.,
Fridland 2014, 2016; Levy 2017). In this talk, I argue that, though automatic
control is indeed sensitive to the semantic content of cognitive states, and
thereby cognitively permeable, it is nonetheless informationally encapsulated
to a significant degree, so that this sensitivity is not the best way to
account for its intelligence. I offer an alternative account of the
intelligence of automatic control that appeals to hierarchical action
representations at a level that is intermediate between intentions and motor
representations, and draw out implications of this view for solving the puzzle
of skilled action, as well as other nearby puzzles in action theory.