mardi 25 novembre 2014

Freedom, Money, and Justice as Fairness (B. Neufeld)

Conférence | Talk



(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee)


Freedom, Money, and Justice as Fairness


The first principle of John Rawls’s conception of ‘justice as fairness’ secures a set of ‘basic liberties’ equally for all citizens within the constitutional structure of society. The ‘worth’ of citizens’ basic liberties, however, may vary depending upon their wealth and income. Against Rawls, G. A. Cohen contends that an absence of money directly constrains citizens’ liberty, and not simply the worth of liberty. Cohen’s argument threatens a core feature of justice as fairness, as it is unclear why the parties within the ‘original position’ would endorse the lexical priority of the first principle over the ‘difference principle’ (which concerns the distribution of wealth and income in society) if both principles similarly shape the freedom enjoyed by citizens. In response to Cohen’s challenge, I advance five points. First, I explain that Rawls is concerned with the freedom of citizens to exercise their two ‘moral powers,’ their ‘sense of justice’ and their capacity for a ‘conception of the good,’ and not their overall ‘negative liberty.’ Second, with respect to citizens’ sense of justice, Rawls’s insistence that the ‘fair value’ of the political liberties be secured for all citizens inoculates this aspect of justice as fairness against Cohen’s challenge. Third, with respect to citizens’ second moral power, it is necessary to distinguish between its two aspects: (a) citizens’ capacity to form and revise their conceptions of the good, and (b) citizens’ capacity to pursue those conceptions. Fourth, clarifying the ‘basic needs principle’ within justice as fairness, including adding to it a right to adequate discretionary time, ensures that citizens will be roughly equally free to form and revise their conceptions of the good. Fifth, with respect to citizens’ freedom to pursue their conceptions of the good, Rawlsians should concede that the difference principle permits inequalities in this freedom, but minimizes them to the greatest feasible extent. I conclude that Cohen’s criticism of Rawls’s distinction between a liberty and its worth is not fatal to justice as fairness.

Friday, November 28th, 2014
3:00pm

Carleton University
River Building

The Justification of Statistical Decisions in Clinical Trials (R. Stanev)

Conférence | Talk


(Ottawa Hospital Research Institute and University of Ottawa Faculty of Medecine)


The Justification of Statistical Decisions in Clinical Trials



In recent years, there has been a growing concern about the proper conduct and monitoring of clinical trials. High on the agenda of clinical researchers is the inadequate reporting of randomized controlled trials (RCTs), including trials that are stopped early due to benefit, harm or futility. Despite efforts from regulatory agencies (e.g., Health Canada) issuing recommendations and guidance for both the conduct and reporting of RCTs, recent systematic reviews of RCTs show that top medical journals continue to publish trials without requiring authors to report sufficient details for readers to evaluate statistical decisions carefully.

In my talk, I present a systematic way of modeling and simulating interim decisions of RCTs. By taking an approach that is both general and rigorous, my proposal models and evaluates early stopping decisions of RCTs based on a clear and consistent set of criteria. The framework permits decision analysts to generate and answer 'what-if' questions by simulating alternate trial scenarios. I illustrate the framework with a case study of an RCT that was stopped early due to futility. This was a trial evaluating an intervention to prevent a brain-infection in HIV+ symptomatic individuals. 

Friday, November 28th, 2014
3:00pm

University of Ottawa
Desmarais Hall (55, Laurier East)
Room 8161

mardi 18 novembre 2014

Emotions and Agency (C. Tappolet)

Conférence | Talk


(Université de Montréal)


Emotions and Agency



What is the relationship between emotions and reasons? This question is central to the assessment of the common claim that emotions constitute a threat to the kind of agency that is often considered to be characteristic of human being, namely, autonomous agency. This is so because the capacity to respond to reasons is often thought to be essential to autonomous agency. The focus will be on cases of akratic actions caused by emotions that conflict with the agent's better judgement. I shall propose that even in such dysfunctional cases, we are able, under certain conditions, not only to track reasons but also to be reason-responsive when we act on our emotions.

Friday, November 21st, 2014
3:00pm

University of Ottawa
Desmarais Hall (55, Laurier East)
Room 8161

mardi 11 novembre 2014

The Monadology : A Conference in Honour of the text of 1714 and its Author, G. W. Leibniz

The Monadology

A Conference in Honour of the text of 1714
And its Author, G. W. Leibniz

Thursday, December 4, 2014
Simard 129
University of Ottawa

Program

9: Graeme Hunter: “Leibniz Gets Spiritual: The Monadology in Context”

10: David Raynor: “Leibniz: Berkeley Freed of Paradox”

11: David Hyder: “Leibniz and Time”

12: Nigel DeSouza: “Leibniz and Herder on Analogy”


LUNCH SOMEWHERE NEARBY


2:30: Laura Byrne: Is Descartes' God a Tyrant? Descartes and Leibniz on the Creation of the Eternal Truths

3:30 Hugh Hunter: “Leibniz, Berkeley, and the Miracle of Failure”

4:30: William Seager: “Leibniz, the “Mill” Argument and Panpsychism”



DRINKS AND DINNER

lundi 10 novembre 2014

Just Flourishing in the Interspecies Community (K. Wayne)

Conférence | Talk



(Queen's University)


Just Flourishing in the Interspecies Community


Domestic animals are deeply vulnerable to exploitation by humans. Their vulnerability to and dependence on humans, while variant in degree, is typically regarded as an essential and deliberate feature of their existence. Having few or no opportunities for living well independently of humans, domestic animals are now recognized by some scholars as being owed a robust form of membership in the mixed community. As a general approach to justice for domestic animals, what I will refer to as the membership model is both attractive and plausible. What it lacks is a satisfying account of just flourishing. Supplying such an account will require attention to variance in the capability of just flourishing among different kinds of beings, and the conflicting obligations that may arise from that variance. I argue that some difficulties with just flourishing result from what I refer to as the problem of harmful needs. Harmful needs, as I conceive of them, are essential to and reliably instantiated in certain forms of life; as such they may preclude the possibility for the mutually realized flourishing in which a good and just society consists. This leads me to claim, contra Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, that certain kinds of domestic animals may be legitimately excluded from membership. If this argument is correct, we are left with a serious ethical dilemma. Some of the domestic animals who we have brought into our community, and who are therefore owed distinctive obligations of care, cannot be included as members of a just interspecies community without jeopardizing the rights of other members. In a separate paper, I review and assess some of the possible responses to this dilemma; here I engage in the prior task of identifying the nature of the dilemma, and the sorts of ethical concepts and approaches we need to address it. I will argue in particular for an account of just flourishing and of harmful needs that is rooted in an ethical naturalist tradition. 

Friday, November 14th, 2014
3:00pm

Carleton University
River Building