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samedi 27 décembre 2014
lundi 8 décembre 2014
Is There a Phenomenology of Agency? (M. Mylopoulos)
Conférence | Talk
(Carleton University and Institut Jean Nicod)
Is There a Phenomenology of Agency?
Tuesday, December 9th, 2014
It
is often held that, just as there is something it is like to smell a rose,
taste chocolate, and hear a siren, there is something it is like to perform an
action. In other words, a view to which many people are drawn is that there
exists a phenomenology of agency. But while this is a common starting point for
further theorizing, rarely is it critically examined on its own. In this paper,
I aim to remedy this situation. First, I clarify what theorists seem to have in
mind when they claim that there is a distinctive, proprietary phenomenology of
agency. Next, I canvass particular strategies for establishing that there is
such a thing. To begin, I explain why introspection alone will not suffice for
this task. Following this, I introduce and employ the socalled method of
phenomenal contrast (cf. Siegel 2012), presenting contrasting pairs of cases, for
which, in the one case, agentive phenomenology may seem to be present, and in
the other, absent. I offer two types of skeptical response to such cases, which
serve to block the inference to the best explanation that is required in order
to establish the existence of agentive phenomenology on their basis. I then
consider two further strategies for dealing with these skeptical responses. I
label these the robust conceivability strategy (Horgan 2012) and the epistemic
access strategy (cf. Goldman 1993; Pitt 2004). I argue that each of these fails
to offer a satisfactory response to the skeptics, and therefore to give us good
reason to believe that there is a phenomenology of agency. I conclude that
skepticism about the existence of such phenomenology is alive and well. In the
final section of the talk, I explain why, even given this result, all hope is
not lost. I offer an account of conscious action that falls short of
establishing that it is accompanied by any distinct, proprietary phenomenology,
but arguably retains all the robust features of our awareness of ourselves as
acting that theorists interested in this phenomenon set out to explain in the
first place.
3:00pm
Carleton University
Dunton Tower
mardi 25 novembre 2014
Freedom, Money, and Justice as Fairness (B. Neufeld)
Conférence | Talk
(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee)
Freedom, Money, and Justice as Fairness
Friday, November 28th, 2014
The first principle of John
Rawls’s conception of ‘justice as fairness’ secures a set of ‘basic liberties’
equally for all citizens within the constitutional structure of society. The
‘worth’ of citizens’ basic liberties, however, may vary depending upon their
wealth and income. Against Rawls, G. A. Cohen contends that an absence of money
directly constrains citizens’ liberty, and not simply the worth of liberty.
Cohen’s argument threatens a core feature of justice as fairness, as it is
unclear why the parties within the ‘original position’ would endorse the
lexical priority of the first principle over the ‘difference principle’ (which
concerns the distribution of wealth and income in society) if both principles
similarly shape the freedom enjoyed by citizens. In response to Cohen’s
challenge, I advance five points. First, I explain that Rawls is concerned with
the freedom of citizens to exercise their two ‘moral powers,’ their ‘sense of
justice’ and their capacity for a ‘conception of the good,’ and not their
overall ‘negative liberty.’ Second, with respect to citizens’ sense of justice,
Rawls’s insistence that the ‘fair value’ of the political liberties be secured
for all citizens inoculates this aspect of justice as fairness against Cohen’s
challenge. Third, with respect to citizens’ second moral power, it is necessary
to distinguish between its two aspects: (a) citizens’ capacity to form and
revise their conceptions of the good, and (b) citizens’ capacity to pursue
those conceptions. Fourth, clarifying the ‘basic needs principle’ within
justice as fairness, including adding to it a right to adequate discretionary
time, ensures that citizens will be roughly equally free to form and revise
their conceptions of the good. Fifth, with respect to citizens’ freedom to
pursue their conceptions of the good, Rawlsians should concede that the difference
principle permits inequalities in this freedom, but minimizes them to the
greatest feasible extent. I conclude that Cohen’s criticism of Rawls’s
distinction between a liberty and its worth is not fatal to justice as
fairness.
3:00pm
Carleton University
River Building
The Justification of Statistical Decisions in Clinical Trials (R. Stanev)
Conférence | Talk
(Ottawa Hospital Research Institute and University of Ottawa Faculty of Medecine)
The Justification of Statistical Decisions in Clinical Trials
Friday, November 28th, 2014
In recent years, there has
been a growing concern about the proper conduct and monitoring of clinical
trials. High on the agenda of clinical researchers is the inadequate reporting
of randomized controlled trials (RCTs), including trials that are stopped early
due to benefit, harm or futility. Despite efforts from regulatory agencies
(e.g., Health Canada) issuing recommendations and guidance for both the conduct
and reporting of RCTs, recent systematic reviews of RCTs show that top medical
journals continue to publish trials without requiring authors to report sufficient
details for readers to evaluate statistical decisions carefully.
In my talk, I present a
systematic way of modeling and simulating interim decisions of RCTs. By taking an
approach that is both general and rigorous, my proposal models and evaluates
early stopping decisions of RCTs based on a clear and consistent set of
criteria. The framework permits decision analysts to generate and answer
'what-if' questions by simulating alternate trial scenarios. I illustrate the
framework with a case study of an RCT that was stopped early due to futility.
This was a trial evaluating an intervention to prevent a brain-infection in
HIV+ symptomatic individuals.
Friday, November 28th, 2014
3:00pm
University of Ottawa
Desmarais Hall (55, Laurier East)
Room 8161
mardi 18 novembre 2014
Emotions and Agency (C. Tappolet)
Conférence | Talk
(Université de Montréal)
Emotions and Agency
Friday, November 21st, 2014
What
is the relationship between emotions and reasons? This question is central to
the assessment of the common claim that emotions constitute a threat to the
kind of agency that is often considered to be characteristic of human being,
namely, autonomous agency. This is so because the capacity to respond to
reasons is often thought to be essential to autonomous agency. The focus will
be on cases of akratic actions caused by emotions that conflict with the
agent's better judgement. I shall propose that even in such dysfunctional
cases, we are able, under certain conditions, not only to track reasons but
also to be reason-responsive when we act on our emotions.
Friday, November 21st, 2014
3:00pm
University of Ottawa
Desmarais Hall (55, Laurier East)
Room 8161
lundi 17 novembre 2014
Rethinking Justice and Care: Gender Inequality in a Global Context (C. Koggel)
Conférence | Talk
***World Philosophy Day Event | Activité de la Journée Internationale de la Philosophie***
(Carleton University)
Rethinking Justice and Care: Gender Inequality in a Global Context
Thursday, November 20th, 2014
7:00pm
Carleton University
Dunton Tower (FASS Lounge)
Room 2017
mardi 11 novembre 2014
The Monadology : A Conference in Honour of the text of 1714 and its Author, G. W. Leibniz
The Monadology
A Conference in Honour of the
text of 1714
And its Author, G. W. Leibniz
Thursday, December 4, 2014
Simard 129
University of Ottawa
University of Ottawa
Program
9: Graeme Hunter: “Leibniz Gets Spiritual:
The Monadology in Context”
10: David Raynor: “Leibniz: Berkeley Freed of
Paradox”
11: David Hyder: “Leibniz and Time”
12: Nigel DeSouza: “Leibniz and Herder on
Analogy”
LUNCH SOMEWHERE NEARBY
2:30: Laura Byrne: Is Descartes' God a
Tyrant? Descartes and Leibniz on the Creation of the Eternal Truths
3:30 Hugh Hunter: “Leibniz, Berkeley, and
the Miracle of Failure”
4:30: William Seager: “Leibniz, the “Mill”
Argument and Panpsychism”
DRINKS AND DINNER
lundi 10 novembre 2014
Just Flourishing in the Interspecies Community (K. Wayne)
Conférence | Talk
(Queen's University)
Just Flourishing in the Interspecies Community
Friday, November 14th, 2014
Domestic animals
are deeply vulnerable to exploitation by humans. Their vulnerability to and
dependence on humans, while variant in degree, is typically regarded as an
essential and deliberate feature of their existence. Having few or no opportunities
for living well independently of humans, domestic animals are now recognized by
some scholars as being owed a robust form of membership in the mixed community.
As a general approach to justice for domestic animals, what I will refer to as
the membership model is both attractive and plausible. What it lacks is a
satisfying account of just flourishing. Supplying such an account will require
attention to variance in the capability of just flourishing among different kinds
of beings, and the conflicting obligations that may arise from that variance. I
argue that some difficulties with just flourishing result from what I refer to
as the problem of harmful needs. Harmful needs, as I conceive of them, are
essential to and reliably instantiated in certain forms of life; as such they may
preclude the possibility for the mutually realized flourishing in which a good
and just society consists. This leads me to claim, contra Sue Donaldson and
Will Kymlicka, that certain kinds of domestic animals may be legitimately
excluded from membership. If this argument is correct, we are left with a serious
ethical dilemma. Some of the domestic animals who we have brought into our
community, and who are therefore owed distinctive obligations of care, cannot
be included as members of a just interspecies community without jeopardizing
the rights of other members. In a separate paper, I review and assess some of
the possible responses to this dilemma; here I engage in the prior task of identifying
the nature of the dilemma, and the sorts of ethical concepts and approaches we
need to address it. I will argue in particular for an account of just
flourishing and of harmful needs that is rooted in an ethical naturalist
tradition.
3:00pm
Carleton University
River Building
jeudi 23 octobre 2014
Comment les Grecs ont-ils inventé la Nature? (A. Macé)
Conférence | Talk
(Université de Franche-Comté)
Comment les Grecs ont-ils inventé la Nature?
Vendredi, 07 novembre 2014
Les
Grecs de l'époque archaïque ne possédaient pas la représentation de la
Nature au sens d'un vaste ensemble peuplé de vivants, de corps et
d'éléments,
terrestres, aquatiques et célestes, unifié par des lois et des principes
communs. Pourtant, cette totalité unifiée apparaît bien à la fin de
l'époque classique, chez Platon et Aristote. Il s'agira de présenter les
catégories et les schèmes qui ont permis cette
évolution progressive, à travers l'époque archaïque et classique,
d'Homère à Hippocrate, en passant par les philosophes présocratiques. On
verra ce faisant que la Nature, a son origine, n'est pas l'autre de la
culture, de la technique ou de la société, mais
que ces dimensions que nous lui opposons spontanément aujourd'hui en
firent d'abord tout simplement partie.
Vendredi, 07 novembre 2014
16h00
Université d'Ottawa
Pavillon Desmarais (55, Laurier East)
Salle 8161
Sites of Deliberation in Contemporary Electoral Systems (D. Weinstock)
Conférence | Talk
(University McGill)
Sites of Deliberation in Contemporary Electoral Systems: On the Deliberative Defence of some Unfashionable Political Institutions
Friday, October 31st, 2014
I argue that if we are concerned with increasing the
potential for deliberation during electoral campaigns in liberal democracies,
we ought to reconsider the disdain which has been heaped by many political
philosophers upon two unfashionable democratic institutions: the "First
Past the Post" electoral system, and party discipline. FPP incentivizes
the creation of broad parties, which are important sites of deliberation and
compromise, and party discipline focusses the attention of voters on party
platforms (rather than, say, on the personalities of candidates) by increasing
the probability that a vote for party X will actually lead to the adoption of
party X's platform.
Friday, October 31st, 2014
3:00pm
University of Ottawa
Desmarais Hall (55, Laurier East)
Room 8161
mardi 21 octobre 2014
Giving Reasons and Basic Logical Laws (P. Philie)
Conférence | Talk
(University of Ottawa)
Giving Reasons and Basic Logical Laws
Friday, November 7th, 2014
3:00pm
Carleton University
River Building
jeudi 16 octobre 2014
Pitfalls in the Constitution of Personhood (N.-F. Wagner)
Conférence | Talk
(Mind, Brain and Neuroethics Research Unit, University of Ottawa)
Pitfalls in the Constitution of Personhood
Friday, October 17th, 2014
The
concept of personhood is bogged down by the entanglement of three closely
related questions. In this talk, I disentangle (1) the question of what defines
personhood from (2) the question of whether personhood is a feature of the real
world. This will then be detached from (3) the question of how personhood is
ascribed to others. I argue that ignoring these dimensions conflates
ontological and normative considerations as to what constitutes personhood.
Particularly, widespread ‘cognitivist’ views are threatened by invalid
inferences from normative premises to factual conclusions. I end with some preliminary
remarks on how evidence from developmental psychology and social neuroscience may
be of use in setting the stage for a more plausible view of personhood.
3:00pm
Carleton University
River Building
mardi 7 octobre 2014
Descartes on Responsibility and Judgment (M. Jayasekera)
Conférence | Talk
(Colgate University)
Descartes on Responsibility and Judgment
Friday, October 10th, 2014
Friday, October 10th, 2014
3:00pm
Carleton University
River Building
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jeudi 2 octobre 2014
Rape : The Question of Experience (L.M. Alcoff)
Conférence | Talk
(Hunter College, CUNY Graduate Center)
Rape : The Question of Experience
Friday, October 3rd, 2014
This
paper will explore the complications involved in decisively naming, and thus interpreting,
experiences of sexual violation. The issues for survivors are twofold: how do
we settle on an interpretation, a word, even, when we articulate experiences of
sexual violation? And, can we imagine a discursive relativism at work in regard
to such events? These questions obviously connect to more general epistemological
questions about the nature of experience formation and the role that experience
plays in our formation of knowledge. If our experiences are discursively and
historically constituted, even in part, by the happenstance of the cultures we
are born into, by what Foucault wonderfully called our historical a priori, how
does this alter the epistemic status, and fruitfulness, of experience claims?
Friday, October 3rd, 2014
12:00pm
Carleton University
Patterson Hall
Classiques des sciences sociales
Les « Classiques des sciences sociales » constituent une occasion de lire un ouvrage important en sciences sociales, qu'on a parfois lu en partie ou dont on a entendu parler, mais qu'on n'a souvent pas eu l'occasion de lire au complet. Les années passées, les « Classiques » ont ainsi permis de découvrir des ouvrages tels que L'Éthique protestante et l'esprit du capitalisme, de Max Weber, les Manuscrits de 1844, de Karl Marx, La condition de l'homme moderne, d'Hannah Arendt, La grande transformation, de Karl Polanyi, ou Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse, d'Émile Durkheim.
Cette année, deux ouvrages de Sigmund Freud, L'avenir d'une illusion et Malaise dans la civilisation, sont au programme. Il s'agit d'ouvrages qui, par les thèmes qu'ils abordent, sauront intéresser à la fois les sociologues, les politologues, les criminologues, les philosophes et les historiens. Après une brève présentation par les animateurs, la discussion est ouverte entre tous les participants. Que l'on fasse partie du corps professoral ou du corps étudiant, tout le monde est le bienvenu !
Les séances auront lieu au FSS5028, de 17h30 à 19h, aux dates suivantes:
2 octobre 2014
30 octobre 2014
13 novembre 2014
22 janvier 2014
5 mars 2014
26 mars 2014
On peut se procurer gratuitement les deux ouvrages en contactant Alexandre Cournoyer à l'adresse courriel ci-dessus indiquée.
CIRCEM@uottawa.ca
vendredi 26 septembre 2014
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mardi 23 septembre 2014
Hermeneutic Fictionalism: A Guide for the Perplexed (G. Contessa)
Conférence | Talk
(Carleton University)
Hermeneutic Fictionalism: A Guide for the Perplexed
Friday, September 26th, 2014
Hermeneutic fictionalism (about some class of entities (e.g.: numbers, propositions, possible worlds, moral properties, or aesthetic properties)) is the view that ordinary speakers engage with sentences that seem to refer to or quantify over those entities analogously to how they engage with the contents of works of fiction—i.e. by participating in an elaborate pretence. One standard objection to hermeneutic fictionalism is that pretence is luminous (i.e. one cannot pretend without knowing one is pretending) and that ordinary speakers do not usually see themselves as engaging in pretence when engaging in the relevant discourse. In this paper, I will argue that, contrary to what is usually assumed, one can engage in pretence without being fully aware of that fact that one is doing so.
Friday, September 26th, 2014
3:00pm
Carleton University
River Building
mardi 16 septembre 2014
La vie et l’après-vie d’un chien : Diogène le cynique et sa tradition (M. Sirois)
C’est avec grand plaisir que le Département des Études anciennes et Sciences des religions vous invite à participer à :
Une conférence intitulée
La vie et l’après-vie d’un chien : Diogène le cynique
et sa tradition
Conférencier
Université McGill
Diogène
de Sinope est une figure évasive et difficile à cerner dans l’histoire
de la philosophie. La biographie et la doxographie
de ce personnage haut en couleur sont obscurcies par leur quasi absence
de témoignages contemporains, mais Diogène demeure un philosophe
incoutournable bien qu’inusité. La conférence mettra en relief quelques
“faits” et abordera la question de la tradition
(évidemment, et nécessairement, littéraire) de Diogène. Entre Histoire et fiction, que peut-on réellement savoir de la vie et la pensée de Diogène?
Et comment peut-on caractériser la tradition par laquelle il nous est connu?
Heure
14h30
19 septembre 2014
Lieu
Salle SMD 123
Pavillon Simard
Université d’Ottawa
60 University, Ottawa
Une colation légère sera servie
Pour plus de renseignements:
Geoffrey Greatrex : 613-562-5800 x. 5808 ou greatrex@uOttawa.ca
Sandra Clark : 613-562-5800 x.1163 ou smclark@uottawa.ca
jeudi 11 septembre 2014
Justification of Deduction and Induction (F. Huber)
Conférence | Talk
(University of Toronto)
Justification of Deduction and Induction
Friday, September 19th, 2014
This
talk will cover some, but not all parts of a rather lengthy paper. The
latter's thesis is that we can justify induction deductively, and that
we can justify deduction
inductively. I will begin by presenting my preferred variant of Hume
(1739; 1748)'s argument for the thesis that we cannot justify the
principle of induction. Then I will criticize the responses the
resulting problem of induction has received by Carnap (1963;
1968) and by Goodman (1954), as well as briefly praise Reichenbach
(1938; 1940)'s approach.
Some
of these authors compare induction to deduction. Haack (1976) compares
deduction to induction, and I will critically discuss her argument for
the thesis that
we cannot justify the principles of deduction next. In concluding I will
defend the thesis that we can justify induction by deduction, and
deduction by induction, and that we can do so in a non-circular way.
Along the way I will show how we can understand deduction
and induction as normative theories, and I will argue that there are
only hypothetical, but no categorical imperatives.
Friday, September 19th, 2014
3:00pm
University of Ottawa
Desmarais Hall (55, Laurier East)
Room 8161
mercredi 10 septembre 2014
Hegel Workshop
Atelier | Workshop
Hegel's Logic
John Burbidge (Trent University – Emeritus), noted
Hegel scholar (The Logic of Hegel’s Logic) and external examiner for Wesley
Furlotte’s upcoming PhD thesis defence, has agreed to lead an informal
discussion on Hegel’s Logic (his own experience with its challenges, solutions
etc.)
 |
| Source : Wikipedia |
Friday, September 19th, 2014
3:00pm
3:00pm
University of Ottawa
Desmarais Building
Room 9143
mardi 9 septembre 2014
In Defense of an Axiological Identification (D. Matheson)
Conférence | Talk
(Carleton University)
In Defense of an Axiological Identification
Friday, September 12th, 2014
Friday, September 12th, 2014
3:00pm
Carleton University
River Building
mardi 26 août 2014
lundi 14 juillet 2014
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PROGRAM(FINAL)20minutesFINAL3%5D3JULY2014-page-002.jpg)
lundi 12 mai 2014
The Philosophy of James of Viterbo
The Philosophy of James of Viterbo
An International Workshop
University of Ottawa
Ottawa, Canada
May 20-22, 2014
 |
| Source : Wikipedia |
James of Viterbo was a
master of theology at the University of Paris in the last decade of the
thirteenth century. He was a contemporary of Godfrey of Fontaines,
Giles of Rome, and Henry of Ghent, and was, like them, a major player in
the philosophical and theological debates of his day. The Ottawa
workshop will be the first international workshop entirely devoted to
the thought of James of Viterbo. It will bring together some of the
leading specialists in James scholarship and will cover all the major
areas of his philosophical oeuvre, namely his philosophical theology,
metaphysics, philosophy of nature, ethics, legal and political
philosophy.
jeudi 3 avril 2014
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vendredi 28 mars 2014
mercredi 26 mars 2014
Dépasser la métaphysique - au nom du Seigneur. Philosophie et théologie selon Jean-Luc Marion (T. Alferi)
Conférence | Talk
(Université de l'Ouest, Angers)
Dépasser la métaphysique - au nom du Seigneur. Philosophie et théologie selon Jean-Luc Marion
Jean-Luc Marion. (Source : Wikipedia)
Mardi, 15 avril, 2014
Mardi, 15 avril, 2014
19h30
Collège universitaire dominicain
96 avenue Empress
Salle Albert-Le-Grand
Salle Albert-Le-Grand
Music & Philosophy (M. Allard/R.L.Gray)
RECITAL AND LECTURE
RÉCITAL ET CONFÉRENCE
Lecture – Conférence
Maxime Allard o.p.
Women and "Salvation" in Wagner's Operas
IN ALBERT THE GREAT HALL
Saturday, March 29th, 2014 at 6:45 p.m.
Saturday, March 29th, 2014 at 6:45 p.m.
Samedi le 29 mars 2014 à 18h45
RECITAL - RÉCITAL
Rebecca Lynn Gray - Soprano
|
lundi 24 mars 2014
Bolzano's Theory of Collections : A Chapter in the history of Formal ontology (P. Rusnock)
Conférence | Talk
(University of Ottawa)
Bolzano's Theory of Collections : A Chapter in the history of Formal ontology
Source : Wikipedia
Friday, March 28th, 2014
Bernard
Bolzano (1781-1848) is now widely recognized for his prescient work in
logic. It is less well known that he was equally creative in
the area Husserl called formal ontology. His most important
contribution there was his theory of collections [Inbegriffe], which received several different treatments in his published and unpublished
writings, beginning with the of the Contributions to a Better-Grounded Presentation of Mathematics (1810), and continuing right through
to the posthumously published Paradoxes of the Infinite
(1851). Bolzano's twentieth-century readers mostly tried to make sense
of Bolzano's theory in terms of Cantor's set theory and Lesniewski's
mereology. But although Bolzano's theory has affinities with both of
these better-known systems, it is different in its details, scope and
approach. My talk will give a general introduction to his mature theory
of collections, discuss some of its applications,
and point towards some areas for future research.
Friday, March 28th, 2014
3:00pm
University of Ottawa
Desmarais Hall (55, Laurier East)
Room 8161
vendredi 21 mars 2014
From the 'Bankruptcy of Science' to the 'Death of Evidence': Science and its Value (S. Psillos)
ISSP Distinguished Speaker: Dr. Stathis Psillos
From the 'Bankruptcy of Science' to the 'Death of Evidence': Science and its Value
Dr. Stathis Psillos, Rotman Canada Research Chair in Philosophy of Science, Department of Philosophy, Western University
Thursday, April 10, 5:00 - 7:00 p.m.
Desmarais Building, University of Ottawa
55 Laurier Avenue East, Room 4101
Free. In English.
Reception to follow talk.
Reception to follow talk.
"The
'war against science' is nothing new. The first 'bankruptcy of science'
debate took place in France at the turn of the 20th century, was
fuelled mostly by conservative public intellectuals, and brought
evidence up for debate. Is history repeating itself now in Canada? The
trend raises important questions: What were and are the key external and
internal criticisms of science and evidence in particular? How are
these tied to a particular image of science? What is needed to defend
science and its claim to objectivity and truth?"
This event organized is in collaboration with the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada's Situating Science Strategic Knowledge Cluster.
mercredi 19 mars 2014
Human Rights and the Priority of the Moral (M. Renzo)
Conférence | Talk
(University of Warwick)
Human Rights and the Priority of the Moral
Friday, March 28th, 2014
Friday, March 28th, 2014
3:00pm
Carleton University
River Building
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