Justification of Deduction and Induction (F. Huber)

Conférence | Talk

Franz Huber

(University of Toronto)

Justification of Deduction and Induction

This talk will cover some, but not all parts of a rather lengthy paper. The latter's thesis is that we can justify induction deductively, and that we can justify deduction inductively. I will begin by presenting my preferred variant of Hume (1739; 1748)'s argument for the thesis that we cannot justify the principle of induction. Then I will criticize the responses the resulting problem of induction has received by Carnap (1963; 1968) and by Goodman (1954), as well as briefly praise Reichenbach (1938; 1940)'s approach. 

Some of these authors compare induction to deduction. Haack (1976) compares deduction to induction, and I will critically discuss her argument for the thesis that we cannot justify the principles of deduction next. In concluding I will defend the thesis that we can justify induction by deduction, and deduction by induction, and that we can do so in a non-circular way. Along the way I will show how we can understand deduction and induction as normative theories, and I will argue that there are only hypothetical, but no categorical imperatives.

Friday, September 19th, 2014

3:00pm

University of Ottawa

Desmarais Hall (55, Laurier East)

Room 8161