(University of Ottawa)
Varieties of Conceptual Disagreement
In perhaps the most familiar kind of disagreement—and certainly the one
typically assumed in philosophical discussions—disagreement consists in one
party’s affirming something which the other denies. This type of disagreement
requires a univocal proposition or judgement toward which the two parties take
opposed stances; if it becomes clear that the two parties are in fact using
different concepts, we lose the supposedly univocal proposition about which they
were thought to disagree, and with it the very disagreement itself. For this
reason, conceptual divergence is generally thought of as a destroyer of
disagreement. I want by contrast to catalogue and investigate some types of
apparent disagreement in which the use of different concepts by the two parties
constitutes their disagreement, to the extent they can be said to have one.
“Thick” ethical concepts provide a possible locus for this kind of disagreement
at the level of concept use and concept selection: my refusal even to employ a
thick concept which you willingly make use of can represent a difference
between us which is aptly characterized as a disagreement. Throughout the
course of my discussion I consider whether the conceptual disagreements I identify
can be reduced to some other, better-known type of disagreement.
Friday, March, 31st, 2017
3:00pm
University of Ottawa
Desmarais Hall
Room 8161
