mardi 28 mars 2017

Varieties of Conceptual Disagreement (S. Stroud)

Conférence | Talk

(University of Ottawa)

Varieties of Conceptual Disagreement

In perhaps the most familiar kind of disagreement—and certainly the one typically assumed in philosophical discussions—disagreement consists in one party’s affirming something which the other denies. This type of disagreement requires a univocal proposition or judgement toward which the two parties take opposed stances; if it becomes clear that the two parties are in fact using different concepts, we lose the supposedly univocal proposition about which they were thought to disagree, and with it the very disagreement itself. For this reason, conceptual divergence is generally thought of as a destroyer of disagreement. I want by contrast to catalogue and investigate some types of apparent disagreement in which the use of different concepts by the two parties constitutes their disagreement, to the extent they can be said to have one. “Thick” ethical concepts provide a possible locus for this kind of disagreement at the level of concept use and concept selection: my refusal even to employ a thick concept which you willingly make use of can represent a difference between us which is aptly characterized as a disagreement. Throughout the course of my discussion I consider whether the conceptual disagreements I identify can be reduced to some other, better-known type of disagreement.

Friday, March, 31st, 2017

University of Ottawa
Desmarais Hall
Room 8161

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