mercredi 1 février 2017

Hume's Moral Pluralism: Recognition and History (D. Perinetti)

Conférence | Talk

(Université du Québec à Montréal)

Source : Wikipedia

Hume's Moral Pluralism: Recognition and History

In this paper, I argue that Hume’s discussion of moral relativism in “A Dialogue” gives him an opportunity to specify the important ‘historical’ dimension that his version of the moral sense theory showcases. Hume offers a very original solution to the problem of reconciling universalism in ethics with sensitivity to historical and cultural differences. He defends the thesis that cultural and historical differences, along with the conflict of values that they generate, far from being an obstacle, are, rather, a condition of possibility for reaching a universal standard of morals. Hume’s universalism in ethics is made possible by, and fully compatible with, conflicts of equally commendable ethical ends; a feature that turns him into a moral pluralist. While developing this interpretation, I argue that, contrary to common readings, Hume adopted the view that our moral responses are acquired rather than innate; and that they are acquired in society and history. This reconstruction of Hume’s position also shows that his conception of moral judgment is closely linked to an understanding of moral experience as based on the reciprocal recognition of moral agents.

Friday, February 3rd, 2017

University of Ottawa
Desmarais Hall
Room 8161

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