(Carleton University)
The Puzzle of Skilled Action
Friday, March 9th, 2018
The puzzle of skilled action is
that of explaining how it is that skilled action exhibits robust intelligence
despite being largely governed by automatic control processes that are often
characterized as brute, reflex-like, and paradigmatically unintelligent.
Recently, some have argued that the automatic control involved in skill is
sensitive in key respects to the semantic content of an agent’s intentions and
other propositional attitude states, and is thereby genuinely intelligent, or
"proto-intelligent", contrary to what others have assumed (e.g.,
Fridland 2014, 2016; Levy 2017). In this talk, I argue that, though automatic
control is indeed sensitive to the semantic content of cognitive states, and
thereby cognitively permeable, it is nonetheless informationally encapsulated
to a significant degree, so that this sensitivity is not the best way to
account for its intelligence. I offer an alternative account of the
intelligence of automatic control that appeals to hierarchical action
representations at a level that is intermediate between intentions and motor
representations, and draw out implications of this view for solving the puzzle
of skilled action, as well as other nearby puzzles in action theory.
Friday, March 9th, 2018
2:30pm
University of Ottawa
Desmarais Hall
Desmarais Hall
Room 8161
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